TSA to swab passengers’ hands at airport

by Grant Martin on

Wash your hands before you went to the airport? You may want to. This week, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is beginning new, extra security measures at our nation’s airports: hand swabs.

Have you ever had a bag “randomly” selected for supplemental screening after pushing it through the X-ray? In addition to the manual search, agents often swipe your bag with a clean cloth and put the material into a shoebox-sized detector. They’re checking for the residue of bomb-making material — potentially undetectable by eye but sniffable by the robot.

That same residue will stick to your hands if you’re not careful, which is what the TSA is hoping to identify in their random hand swabs. It’s just speculation, but our guess is that the underwear bomber had traces of PETN on his hands, so the TSA now thinks that they can foil plots better by checking those members.

Provided, that is, that they swab the right person’s hands. As with many of the TSA’s initiatives, this new hand-swabbing effort is a random operation, so if the perpetrator gets lucky and doesn’t get swabbed — well, then the problem moves onward.

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Decoding TSA security bins

by Amy Chen on

Bin advertising at TSA security checkpoints has been around for a couple years. What’s new is that more airports are rolling out bins that are now labeled with letters and numbers.

I first noticed the stickers in early January when flying from JFK to Seattle. I hadn’t seen the labels when traveling over the holidays, so I wondered: were the stickers added after the Christmas Day underwear bomber made it through the checkpoints?

I contacted the TSA and was told that the stickers, which don’t appear on the X-rays, are placed on the bins by the same companies that manage the ads–not TSA.

Some background: the TSA doesn’t get involved with the advertisers and doesn’t collect any money from the ads. Rather, the program is a direct relationship between the advertisers (Zappos.com, Charles Schwab, Hanes, Amtrak, to name a few) and the respective airport authority. In return for allowing the ads, the TSA gets the use of the bins, stainless-steel tables, and carts.

After contacting the TSA, I was directed to SecurityPoint Media, a subcontractor for the bin-advertising program at the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey.

Joe Ambrefe, the president and CEO of SecurityPoint Media, responded to my questions via e-mail and shared the following info:

1. The labels, known as “tether ID” numbers, were developed in 2001 and first used at a U.S. airport in a 2005 pilot program.

2. The bin stickers were created to improve communication at the checkpoint. In the event you’re pulled aside for secondary screening, the tether IDs are meant to help you identify your belongings. (I imagine saying “D11” is more precise than pointing and saying “That one over there.”) It’s also a way for TSA agents to positively identify bins that require a more thorough search.

3. The numbers, which are captured by overhead security cameras, are unique to each airport and do not repeat. (Let’s assume the security cameras are turned on and recording like they’re supposed to.)

So it seems that while the would-be underwear bomber has made these tether IDs more relevant than ever, this program was already well in the works.

My contact at the TSA tells me that the bin-advertising program recently expanded to New York (JFK, LGA, EWR) and Chicago, with possibly more airports on the way. Participating airports already include Denver, Seattle, L.A., and San Francisco. Apparently airport authorities are fans of the advertising program because the bins are replaced with new ads every 90 days, which means clean, new containers for everyone.

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Airport security — what works, and what does not?

by Scott Carmichael on

With so much talk about new explosive detection equipment and the upcoming full body scanners, we decided to look into some of the current technology in place at airports around the world. What works, and what does not?

Will the future of airport security involve everyone stripping down to their underpants? Or will technology evolve to the point where computers can detect terrorists from a distance?

Metal detector

The airport metal detector is a piece of equipment that works absolutely perfectly – for finding metal. It won’t detect explosives, ceramic knives or anything else that is not metallic. And it isn’t designed for that – its sole purpose is to detect metal objects.

Anyone who has left their belt on, or had some loose change will know how sensitive these things are.

Why they don’t always work: Can only detect metal. Can’t sense explosives, ceramic blades or liquids.

The x-ray machine

At the airport, baggage is checked at two places – at the security checkpoint, and at the checked bag drop-off. These machines are pretty good. But they have a fatal flaw – they can’t detect anything without the presence of a human operator. And lets be honest – someone that has to sit in front of a monitor looking at bags move past them will never reach a 100% accuracy. Things will slip through the cracks.

Why they don’t always work: The human element is the weak spot. Unable to “sniff” for explosives.


Passenger puffer machine

The “puffer machine” was supposed to be the ultimate in airport security. You step into the machine, it blows puffs of air on you, and “smells” for explosives. It all sounds like the perfect solution. These machines were in place at several airports on a trial basis before they were all removed due to “unforeseen technical problems”.

Millions were invested in the devices, which are now probably collecting dust in a storage facility. High profile research labs are still working on better solutions, and there are several very promising technologies in the very early stages of development. Sadly, without some really serious government money, those machines won’t be at your local airport any time soon.

Why they don’t always work: Citing “technical difficulties”, they are no longer in use at US airports.

Swab explosives detector

Anyone who has been pulled aside for a secondary search (the dreaded “SSSS” on your boarding pass” will have seen the screening expert “swab” their bag and place the sample inside an expensive looking machine. The machine sniffs for explosives, and can detect the smallest trace of stuff that can blow up a plane.

Why they don’t always work: only passengers selected for secondary screening are pulled aside for a swab detection. Easy to get a false positive.

Full body imager

The full body imager (or whole body imager / millimeter wave scanner) is supposed to be the holy grail of airport security. After the Nigerian underpants bomber was pulled off his plane, these new machines popped up in the news and within days, the first ones were being ordered for European airports.

Tests have been conducted on the machines, and there is a very big chance that the underpants bomber would not have been caught had he passed through one. Then there is of course the issue of privacy. We all want to fly on a plane without any terrorists wearing bombs wrapped around their groin, but apparently we draw the line at letting security staff stare at our naked bodies on a TV screen. To make matters worse, we were promised that none of the US based machines could store or send our images, but CNN already discovered that was was a lie.

Why they don’t always work: Only at select airports, only passengers pulled aside for secondary screening are asked to voluntarily go through the machine, possibly not 100% reliable.

Passenger no-fly lists

The super secret passenger no-fly lists collect data from several sources. It isn’t necessarily filled with the names of the worst terror suspects in the world, and the list has been proven to be terribly inaccurate. Worst of all, those people that have a name that matches something on the list have had a hell of a time getting through airport security.

The Nigerian underpants bomber was on one list of terror suspects, but apparently was not considered dangerous enough to warrant adding to the no-fly list. At the same time, 8 year old kids are stopped because their name matches someone dangerous.

Why they don’t always work: Too much data, but not enough ways to find the bad guys.

Pat-down

Pat-downs have been proven to be ineffective – and for one simple reason; fear of embarrassing travelers. The underpants bomber would have successfully passed a pat-down because screening staff don’t do a comprehensive search. The only kind of search that will work, is the kind used in prisons.

You can’t find explosives attached to someones private parts if you don’t physically search that area. Is a full effective pat-down embarrassing? You bet it is. But it is a heck of a lot more effective than just waving a wand up and down your legs.

Why they don’t work: You can’t perform a full search, without performing an actual FULL search,

(Images courtesy of Flickr users Daquella Manera and jcortell – click images for direct source)

What strange things have been found on planes?


Ideas for fixing airport security

by Aaron Hotfelder on

Last week Slate held a contest calling for the best ideas to improve airport security. Yesterday, the site announced the winning entries as chosen by a panel of security experts. Among the winners:

  • In third place, Marianne Nassef suggests prohibiting those on the No-Fly list from purchasing airline tickets. “Nothing gets denied faster than a credit card,” she says. Of course, this idea faces the “false positive” problem that has presented itself repeatedly with the No-Fly list, with children and other innocents ending up on the list. And as Slate notes, “[T]he bad guys are likely to catch on and work around the system…”
  • In second place, Neil Stelzner and Phil Nettl call for using FBI trainees at airport security, which would introduce bona fide law enforcement personnel to the airport security process.
  • In first place, Benton Love suggests what any Econ 101 student knows: Incentives matter. Under this plan, undercover federal agents would constantly test TSA agents by trying to sneak bombs and other contraband by them. Screeners would be paid a bonus for each prohibited item they detected, and docked for every similar item that passed. This would give screeners a major incentive to keep a careful watch at all times.

Slate is forwarding the winning ideas to the White House, the TSA, and Congress. More here.

Airport security fail

by Aaron Hotfelder on

We give the TSA a lot of well-deserved guff here on Gadling, but we can’t blame them for the picture above, which shows a security officer at Marco Polo Airport in Venice, Italy, occupying his or her time with a bit of solitaire.

You’re off the hook this time, TSA. But we still haven’t forgotten about this.

[Photo courtesy of FailBlog, via the Vagabondish Twitter feed]

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